Website: ATMBC.COM

The mission is to provide a fresh platform for the ATM professionels.

Creating connections, interchange of ideas, discussion about the banking industy and much more.

There are no entry fees and no “inside” communication fees. The members can freely communicate and offer their parts on the marketplace. It is also an excellent way to find obsolete parts.

The ATMBC is a partner of obsoleteatmparts and cashotec.

All kind of banking industry members are very welcome too. No matter if you are selling banknote counters, banking software, printer ribbons or simply paper rolls for ATMs give it a try.

Please feel free to join the ATMBC simply by creating a user account on its website and be part of it!

Contact: info@atmbc.com

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The new Anti-Skimming II module thwarts attempts to steal card data at ATMs that take place when skimming devices are attached to the card entry slot and the customer’s PIN is stolen. The module recognizes a wide variety of skimmers when they are mounted on the ATM, and disrupts them in their attempts to read card data. If a suspicious device is detected, the system initiates a silent alarm, and follow-up actions, such as video monitoring and recording, can also be triggered.

The rising number of attacks on ATMs has also meant an increase in the variety of manipulation attempts. Optical Security Guard – Wincor Nixdorf’s optimal system monitoring solution – protects the new CINEO systems from a wide array of attacks. Intelligent recognition processes mean that criminal alterations to the device, such as keypad overlays, skimming devices, hidden or disguised cameras, or other changes – such as those that enable cash trapping – are identified immediately.

The company’s extensive portfolio of security solutions is rounded out by a consulting and service offer. On the basis of a detailed analysis of an ATM operator’s existing security processes, experts develop tailored proposals that can range from individual systems to the complete monitoring of all systems and all bank branches

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San Francisco – July 14, 2009

Visa Inc. (NYSE: V) today announced global requirements for financial institutions to ensure their merchant customers and agents use secure payment applications that do not store prohibited data elements and adhere to the Payment Card Industry (PCI) Payment Application Data Security Standard (PA-DSS).

The PA-DSS is a global set of security requirements for software vendors who develop payment applications. PA-DSS compliant applications do not store prohibited data such as track data, sensitive authentication data, or PIN data, helping merchants and agents who use them mitigate compromises and support overall compliance with the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS).

In Asia Pacific (AP); Central and Eastern Europe, Middle East and Africa (CEMEA); and Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), Visa acquirers must ensure that newly signed merchants use PA-DSS compliant applications by 1 July 2010. By 1 July 2012, those acquirers must ensure existing merchants and agents in the Visa network use PA-DSS compliant applications.

As previously communicated to U.S. and Canada financial institutions, Visa acquirers must ensure that all new and existing merchants and agents in the Visa network use PA-DSS compliant applications by 1 July 2010.

Visa research confirms that vulnerable payment applications are a major cause of compromise incidents, particularly among small merchants. “Criminals are targeting certain versions of software known to have security vulnerabilities,” said Eduardo Perez, head of global data security, Visa Inc. “It’s essential that every business that handles payment card information adhere to the highest data protection standards to protect the security and privacy of their customers’ financial information,” Perez said.

Visa recommends that merchants and agents ask their payment application vendors, resellers or system integrators to confirm that software versions used do not store magnetic-stripe, PIN data or security codes. “Merchants with vulnerable payment applications should move quickly to either patch or upgrade their systems,” Perez said.

A list of products that have been independently validated against Visa’s Payment Application Best Practices (PABP) or the PA-DSS can be found at www.pcisecuritystandards.org or www.visa.com/cisp.

About Visa

Visa operates the world’s largest retail electronic payments network providing processing services and payment product platforms. This includes consumer credit, debit, prepaid and commercial payments, which are offered under the Visa, Visa Electron, Interlink and PLUS brands. Visa enjoys unsurpassed acceptance around the world and Visa/PLUS is one of the world’s largest global ATM networks, offering cash access in local currency in more than 170 countries. For more information, visit www.corporate.visa.com.

Contacts:
Sandra Chu, Visa Inc.
Tel: +1 415 932 2564
E-mail: globalmedia@visa.com

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can anyone provide me with some detailed information about a CCD camera for a NCR ATM? The only thing I have is the part number

0090009918 – NCR CCD camera

Where to buy, what price…

Thank you in advane. To contact me please use the contact form.

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The malware contains advanced management functionality allowing the attacker to fully
control the compromised ATM through a customized user interface built into the malware.
This interface is accessible by inserting controller cards into the ATM’s card reader.
SpiderLabs analysts do not believe the malware includes networking functionality that
would allow it to send harvested data to other, remote locations via the Internet. The
malware does, however, allow for the output of harvested card data via the ATM’s receipt
printer or by writing the data to an electronic storage device (possibly using the ATM’s card
reader). Analysts also discovered code indicating that the malware could eject the cash-
dispensing cassette.

What follows is a high-level summary of the key features identified during Trustwave’s in-
depth analysis of the malware sample. It is, however, believed that this is a relatively early
version of the malware and that subsequent versions have seen significant additions to its
functionality.

Method of Infection of the ATM

The malware is installed and activated through a dropper file (a file that an attacker can use to
deploy tools onto a compromised system) by the name of
isadmin.exe. It is a Borland
Delphi Rapid Application Development (RAD) executable and is essentially a replacement for
the original
isadmin.exe utility written by Bill Stewart (www.westmesatech.com/wast.html).
The dropper binary contains a Data Resource (RCDATA) named
PACKAGEINFO which in turn
contains the actual malware.
Executing the dropper file produces the malware file
lsass.exe within the C:\WINDOWS
directory of the compromised system and does so via functionality provided by a Windows API
(Application Programming Interface).
Once the malware is extracted, the dropper proceeds to manipulate the ‘Protected Storage’
service—this normally handles the legitimate
lsass.exe executable, located in the
C:\WINDOWS\system32 directory—to point towards the newly created malware. The
service is also configured to automatically restart in the event that it crashes, ensuring that the
malware remains active.

Targeting Track Data

The malware itself is also a Borland Delphi Graphic User Interface (GUI)-compiled executable,
launched as a Microsoft Windows service. It contains the ability to enumerate the available
printing devices. Once active, the malware intercepts ATM transactions by injecting code into
targeted processes through the binary modification of these processes in memory.
The first process targeted by the malware appears to be a system-messaging utility, while the
other is a form of ATM software service.
Once it resides in the memory, the malware polls the transaction message queue looking for
track 2 data from the current transaction. It then performs a level of validation and
manipulation against this track data to determine whether the transaction is the attacker’s
trigger or controller card or a valid transaction involving track data that the malware collects
by recording it in a file. The trigger cards (either a master function card or a single function
card) allow an attacker to interact with and control both the malware and the ATM.
When the parsing routine fails to identify a trigger card, the malware stores the transaction
information in a temporary file named
tr12 in the C:\WINDOWS directory. The malware
harvests transactions as well as balance enquiries provided the currency indicated is American
Dollar (USD), Russian Rouble (RUR) or the Ukrainian Hryvnia (UAH).
Additionally, the malware harvests what is believed to be key or PIN data, saving the
information in a file
C:\WINDOWS\kl.

Primary Command Options and Functionality

When a trigger card is detected, a small window appears giving the user 10 seconds to select
one of 10 command options using the ATM’s keypad.

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